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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
since it has modified the common law rule. The minority view would call for
an extension of the scope of the notice which under a restrictive interpretation
would appear to be unwarranted. The protection afforded by lis pendens would
not aid the plaintiff in this matter. As hereinbefore mentioned, whether the
lis pendens is continued or not will have no bearing on the effectiveness of the
court's decision concerning the nuisance, and plaintiff's rights acquired by a
favorable judgment can not be lost by a transfer of defendant's interests.
Conversely, the notice to a purchaser of the encroachment is obvious without
the aid of a pendency in action. The Court's construction of the word "use" is
reasonable. If it is extended, as the minority advocates, to cases where the
claim is simply a nuisance, the door will be open for its use in all cases, with
the attendant ill of injuring marketability, even where the cause of action is
remotely associated with the land, since the possession and title to the land
are not crucial to the judgment. This would not be consonant with the purposes
of the statute to prevent the alienation of the res, which would cause the
decision to be ineffective. Certainly it would benefit both the litigants and the
bench to take notice of the advantageous results of a lis pendens order, such
as putting a purchaser on notice by making plaintiffs claim a public record
for all to see. However, as previously mentioned, affirming the order would not
effectuate the relevant considerations.
G. S. L.
TAXATION
APPORTIONMENT

OF ESTATE TAXES AmONG INDIVIDUAL AND CHARITABLE

LEGATEES
A codicil to a will provided that all taxes, including those on $1,050,000
in pre-residuary gifts, were to come from the $17,500,000 residue. The residue
was to be equally divided between a charitable trust, which enjoyed a charitable
exemption, and three individual trusts. Section 124 of the New York Decedent
Estate Law provides that, where express provisions of the will are not to the
contrary, the residue will be apportioned and taxes paid out of the individual
gifts. Surrogate's Court held that section 124 applied to the estate and death
taxes attributable to the residue, and also that income during the time that
the estate was being settled be paid according to ratios established after
apportionment and tax. A provision of the will directed that taxes on preresiduary gifts be deducted from the residuary estate prior to computation of
residuary shares. The intermediate court modified the Surrogate's Court
determination by ordering that during the period of administration, the ratios
set up in the will be used to determine the payment of income in accordance
with section 17-b of the New York Personal Property Law. On appeal, held,
affirmed. The testator did not expressly state that he did not want section 124
to apply and thus did not rule out apportionment. So, apportionment must
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stand. Income will be distributed as determined by the intermediate court. In
the Matter of the Will of Shubert, 10, N.Y.2d 461, 180 N.E.2d 410, 225 N.Y.S.
2d 13 (1962). 1
Section 124 of the New York Decedent Estate Law provides that federal
and state estate taxes be apportioned among the legatees and devisees in the
proportion that the value of the property left to each bears to the value of the
whole of the property. This rule does not apply if the testator directs otherwise
in his will. Also, any exemption or deduction which the law allows because
of the charitable purposes of the gift goes to the benefit of the person receiving
such charitable gift. Thus, if the statute applies and part of the estate goes
to a non-taxable charity or foundation or person, all of the estate taxes, though
their total would be substantially reduced, would have to be paid by the other
devisees of the estate. Because the amount payable by the taxable recipients of
property would probably be higher in such a case, these persons try to reduce
their share of the tax load by endeavoring to show that section 124 does not
apply. Non-taxable recipients attempt to apply the statute and escape tax
liability by receiving their shares before the tax is assessed. The burden of
proof is on him who wishes to show that the statute does not apply.2 By the
language of the will a testator may place the tax burden on one who would
normally be exempt, but the Court will not assume such intent. Thus, a
husband leaving property to his widow and two sisters may burden the widow
by specifically stating that section 124 does not apply and in this way causing
the whole amount to be taxed and the widow to pay her share. If he does not
so state, the widow is exempt, and the sisters pay all applicable estate taxes.3
To determine whether testator meant section 124 to apply, the Court must look
for an unambiguous direction, and look at the will as a whole. 4 When equality
is spoken of, that is, equality of shares, this does not necessarily mean equality
of tax burden. It may simply mean dividing the whole amount, before any taxes,
and then deducting applicable taxes only from the taxable shares. 5 In the
instant case, equality prior to tax is termed "gross equality"; equality after
tax as "net equality." Income distribution makes up the second major point
in the case. Two factors are paramount. Simplicity of accounting procedures 6
and the intention of the testator as expressed in the proportions set up by him
in the will7 require distribution of income according to the ratios in the will, not
according to constantly changing estimates of what each share of the residue
1.
2.
(1954).
3.
4.
5.

Affirming 10 AD.2d 823, 200 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1st Dep't 1960).
In the Matter of the Estate of Pepper, 307 N.Y. 242, 250, 120 N.E.2d 807, 811
In the Matter of the Estate of Pepper, 307 N.Y. 242, 120 N.E.2d 807 (1954).
Id. at 251, 120 N.E.2d at 811.
In the Matter of the Estate of Williams, 12 Misc. 2d 136, 176 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Surr.

Ct. 1958).

6. Id. at 139, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
7. In the Matter of the Estate of Mattes, 12 Misc. 2d 502, 172 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Surr. Ct.

1958).
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will be worth after tax. The intention of the testator regarding residue and
income during administration is what the Court strives to discover.
In the instant case, the Court held without dissent in favor of statutory
apportionment. It stated that the testator is presumed to know the law and the
impact of estate taxes. "Since he did not expressly make a direction against
apportionment within the residuary, he must be presumed to have intended
'gross equality' or equality prior to taxes ... *"8 To determine this intention
the Court first looked to the words of the will. It also looked at the whole
will, including earlier provisions which were overruled by codicils. Discussing
the use of the word "equal" in an earlier provision, the Court pointed out that
because all beneficiaries would have been subject to tax and would have enjoyed equality after tax, does not mean that the intention of the testator was
that all should share equally in the residue after tax according to the final
testamentary scheme. Indeed, the Court stated that his creation of a charitable
trust and his change of the prior provision indicates an intention to favor this
trust. This seems to be reinforced in the Court's reasoning by the fact that
the individuals for whom trusts are set up are "collateral relations." These
persons, under the codicil, receive no portion of the remainders or principal of
the residuary estate which all goes to the charitable trust; under the original
will, the individual income beneficiaries received remainders; the charitable
foundation received only a contingent remainder in each case. The Court
therefore found that the testator intended to favor the foundation and that
to benefit it he permitted section 124 to apply, with the result that the foundation would receive its share of the residuary estate before any taxes were
assessed. During this period, however, the income would be distributed one
half to the charitable trust, the other half to the individual trusts. The Court
found that one ratio for distribution was intended by the statute (Personal
Property Law section 17-b) and also that this would simplify accounting procedures and save expense to beneficiaries.
The need to make a testator's intention unmistakably clear is underlined
by this case. The draftsman should specifically state the testator's intention
regarding section 124. In the instant case, recipients of individual trusts drew
their arguments from the results which would follow if section 124 was applied.
They showed that this would reduce the value of the individual trusts and
implied that it must have been the intent of the testator to favor individuals
over a charitable trust for a foundation. The Court, looking at the will, determined that testator probably favored the foundation and made no mention
of section 124 so that it would apply., In any event, if no mention is made,
the Court presumes that testator knows about it and wants the section to apply.
W. W. M. Jr.
8. In the Matter of the Will of Shubert, 10 N.Y.2d 461, 473, 180 N.E.2d 410, 416, 225
N.Y.S.2d 13, 21 (1962).
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TORTS
CONTRACTOR HELD ACTIVELY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND NOT
ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FROM SUB-CONTRACTOR

Defendant Shulman (hereinafter called contractor) entered into a contract
with defendant, Board of Education of the City of New York, to renovate
certain rooms in a public school in the Bronx. In order to facilitate the work,
contractor erected a boom which was suspended over the school play yard from
a fourth floor window. To remove rubbish accumulated in the work area, contractor hired Andrew Bedden (hereinafter called sub-contractor). Contractor
knew that the usual way of removing debris on this type of job was by use of
a boom, that sub-contractor had used booms on other jobs, and that the boom
constructed in the school was available for sub-contractor's use. Contractor did
not mention safeguards to be used on the job. Reporting to the school, subcontractor was directed to the fourth floor where the rubbish was located.
Shortly thereafter, infant plaintiff, while "spinning his top" in the school play
yard during recess, was hit on the head by a falling board. Plaintiff sued
contractor and the Board of Education to recover damages for his personal
injuries. Contractor commenced a third-party action against sub-contractor
for common-law indemnification, but this complaint was dismissed as a matter
of law. The jury then returned an award of $120,000 for the plaintiff. The
Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the award but reversed, by a divided
court, the dismissal of the third-party complaint.' On appeal by the subcontractor to the Court of Appeals held, reversed, one judge dissenting. Under
the facts and circumstances of this case, the failure of contractor to provide
the required safeguards in an area of known inherent danger and his failure to
correct the dangerous situation which he created was active negligence. Colon v.
Board of Educ., 11 N.Y.2d 446, 184 N.E.2d 294, 230 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1962).
Where the negligence of two or more persons concur to produce a single
indivisible injury to a third party, all the wrongdoers are jointly and severally
liable for the entire damage. In such a case if a joint money judgment is
recovered, and one tort-feasor pays more than his pro rata share, he may obtain
contribution from the other tort-feasors who were joined in the action.2 Often,
however, a wrongdoer will seek indemnity rather than contribution. The
reason for this is that in contribution the loss is shared among the several
wrongdoers, whereas if indemnity is obtained, a total shifting on the entire
economic loss from one wrongdoer to another will be accomplished. Legally,
contribution and indemnity are distinguished by the element of equal fault. If
the parties are in pari delicto, indemnity will not be available. However, if it
can be shown that one party is an active wrongdoer while the other is merely
a passive wrongdoer, then a right to indemnity will arise in favor of the latter
1. 14 A.D.2d 842, 220 N.Y.S.2d 875 (1st Dep't 1961).
2. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 211(a).

